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LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE
I. INTRODUCTION
Estate and business planning for farm and ranch clients is complex
due to their unique planning needs.' This complexity is multiplied
exponentially when a member of the farm or ranch family suffers (or
is likely to suffer) from an illness, disease, or injury that will require
long-term health care.
The cost of long-term health care is high.2 Quite often an impor-
tant planning goal for farmers and ranchers is to transfer the farming
or ranching operation intact to the next generation. As a result, avoid-
ance of an unnecessary depletion of operating assets as well as sale of
the land to pay for long-term health care becomes a primary objective.
The Medicaid program is the primary source of public assistance
for persons living in nursing homes 3 and is the primary public finan-
cier of long-term health care.4 While many practitioners may believe
that the Medicaid qualification rules' limit benefit eligibility to only
the very poor, significant planning opportunities exist which can be
utilized to qualify an individual for Medicaid benefits who otherwise
has the financial resources to pay the cost of long-term care. Conse-
1. The unique planning needs of farmers and ranchers include the traditionally
close relationship of the farm family to the farm firm and the historic dominance
of the sole proprietorship organizational form. For example, in 1987, 86.7% of all
farms were operated as sole proprietorships. Of those farms operated in the cor-
porate form, 90.7% were family held. 1987 CENSUS OF AGRCU-LTURE, (Geographic
Series, Vol. 1 1990). Other factors contributing to the unique planning needs of
farmers and ranchers include the constraints placed on the use of some tradi-
tional organizational forms (i.e., state restrictions on corporate farming); the
existence of land as a major portion of the farm and ranch estate leading to a low
ratio of liquid to fixed assets; and the relatively modest use of life insurance.
2. In 1992, the national average annual nursing home cost was $36,000. In addi-
tion, it is estimated that for those persons born in 1925, 43% will enter a nursing
home at least once before they die. Peter Kemper and Christopher M. Murtaugh,
Lifetime Use of Nursing Home Care, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 595 (1991).
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
4. The Medicare Program, to a limited extent, covers nursing home care. Medicare
will pay the nursing home bill for the first 20 days if admission to the nursing
home is within 30 days of a discharge from a hospital stay of three or more days.
Medicare pays a portion of the nursing bill for days 21-100 and nothing for resi-
dencies extending beyond 100 days. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A) (1992).
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), an agency of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services which directs the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, estimates that the number of Americans covered by Medicaid in fiscal
year 1992 was 31.6 million with outlays from the federal government totalling
67.8 billion ($2,145.57 per person). Department of Health and Human Services,
News Release Medicare and Medicaid Guide, New Developments (CCH) T 41,312
(Mar. 17, 1993).
Total outlays (federal and state) are projected to be $359 billion annually by
the year 2000 ($1,436.00 for every man, woman, and child in the United States
assuming a near constant U.S. population of 250 million). Id. at T 41,527. In
addition, about 40% of persons with AIDS have their health care costs (estimated
to average $38,000 per person/per year in 1992) paid for by Medicaid. Id.
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quently, it becomes imperative for practitioners to consider the impact
of traditional planning techniques on Medicaid eligibility as well as
the feasibility of incorporating Medicaid planning options into the
overall estate and business plan.
This Article will focus on specific planning options that practition-
ers should consider when counseling clients facing long-term health
care. Both recent changes in Medicaid rules as well as significant re-
cent case law will be discussed in this Article. However, a detailed
analysis of the various Medicaid rules and regulations, including a
discussion of the Medicaid eligibility rules, is not within the scope of
this Article.5
II. MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
Recent court decisions have helped clarify some of the Medicaid
statute's eligibility rules and regulations. The Medicaid eligibility
rules constitute the most important part of the Medicaid program be-
cause they serve as the primary barrier to receipt of program benefits
for Medicaid applicants.
A. Circumstances Test
The circumstances test entitles certain categories of persons to
Medicaid benefits.6 States participating in the Medicaid program
have the option to cover "medically needy" persons.7 "Medically
needy" persons are those persons whose income is too high to entitle
them to Medicaid benefits but who otherwise meet all categorical cri-
teria for entitlement.8 "Medically needy" persons become eligible for
Medicaid benefits when their combined income and asset levels are
insufficient to meet the costs of their health care.9
A recent Connecticut federal district court case dealt with the eligi-
bility status of individuals denied participation in Connecticut's home
based health care program (HCBS) because they had too much in-
come.10 However, had these individuals been institutionalized in a
nursing home, their asset and income levels would have been insuffi-
5. For a thorough discussion of the Medicaid statute, rules and regulations, includ-
ing a discussion of the Medicaid qualification rules, see Roger A. McEowen and
Neil E. Harl, Estate Planning for the Elderly and Disabled: Organizing the Es-
tate to Qualify for Federal Medical Extended Care Assistance, 24 IND. L. REv.
1379 (1991).
6. Id.
7. 42 C.F.R. § 435. 1(b)(3)(i) (1993). See also Correll v. Division of Social Serv., 418
S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1992).
8. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1(b)(3)(i) (1993).
9. Id. See also Ross v. Department of Human Serv., 469 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
10. Skandalis v. Rowe, 811 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1993).
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cient to meet the costs of their nursing home care. The Medicaid pro-
gram permits states to operate a home care program." The Medicaid
HCBS program allows a state to provide medical services at the state's
option to any group or groups of individuals who are not categorically
needy but who would be eligible under the state plan if they were in a
medical institution. If not for this provision of home or community
based services, such individuals would require the level of care pro-
vided in a hospital, nursing facility, or intermediate care facility.12
In addition, the Medicaid statute conditions a state's participation
in the HCBS program upon a finding by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (hereinafter Secretary) that the estimated Medicaid
expenditure will not exceed "the average per capita expenditure that
the State reasonably estimates would have been made in that fiscal
year for expenditures under the State plan for such individuals if the
waiver had not been granted."'3 In Skandalis v. Rowe,14 the plain-
tiffs' were denied participation in the state waiver program on the
ground that their income exceeded 300% of the monthly Social Serv-
ices income grant. Had they been institutionalized, they would have
been eligible for Medicaid benefits as medically needy. Yet they were
denied participation in Connecticut's HCBS.
At issue was whether the provision for the Medicaid home and
community based services program required the state of Connecticut
to include those persons eligible for Medicaid benefits as "medically
needy." The court found the plaintiffs' to be eligible for the HCBS pro-
gram under the statute's express terms.' 5 The court added that the
statute provided no basis for denial of participation in the HCBS pro-
gram to an individual based on the manner in which such individual
qualified for Medicaid. Further, the court stated that Congress in-
tended to enable the elderly to avoid institutionalization when they
could be safely cared for in the community, so long as that goal could
be accomplished without increasing Medicaid expenditures.16 Conse-
quently, Connecticut's scheme would result in an incongruity whereby
the state could be required to provide Medicaid coverage for the plain-
tiffs' institutional care but not for the plaintiffs' home care, although
experience has proven the latter alternative to be less costly, equiva-
lently appropriate, and safe.
Under the circumstances test, all recipients of categorical welfare
assistance are entitled to Medicaid.17 In 1972, Congress restructured
11. 42 U.S.CA4. § 1396n(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
12. Id. § 1396n(c)(2)(C).
13. Id. § 1396n(c)(2)(D).
14. 811 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1993).
15. Id. at 785.
16. Id. at 787.
17. 42 U.S.CA. § 1396a(a)(10) (West Supp. 1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.120-.135 (1993).
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the Social Security program and replaced three of the four welfare
assistance programs with Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the
aged, blind, and disabled.' 8 This restructuring broadened Medicaid
income eligibility requirements, resulting in a significant increase in
the number of individuals categorically eligible for Medicaid in many
states.19 As a result, in 1974, Congress offered participating states
the ability to elect to provide Medicaid only to those persons who
would have been eligible under that particular state's Medicaid plan
in affect on January 1, 1972.20 This election is commonly known as
the "section 209(b) option," and states making the election are known
as "section 209(b) states."2 1
In section 209(b) states, Medicaid eligibility criteria must be at
least as restrictive as the SSI criteria and may be no more restrictive
than the criteria in effect under a particular state's Medicaid plan as
of January 1, 1972.22 Before 1988, it was commonly thought that only
those states whose plans in effect on January 1, 1972, contained eligi-
bility criteria more restrictive than the SSI criteria could elect to be-
come a section 209(b) state. In addition, it was believed that section
209(b) states could not provide Medicaid coverage to persons who
would not qualify for Medicaid in an SSI state. In 1988, Congress en-
acted the Federal Methodology Statute23 which stated that ". . . [t]he
methodology to be employed in determining income and resource eligi-
bility for individuals under... [section 209(b)] ... may be less restric-
tive, and shall be no more restrictive than the methodology... [under
the Supplemental Security Income program]... "24 The effective date
of this statute was October 1, 1988.
In Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Payne,25 the state
Medicaid agency argued that Indiana, as a section 209(b) state, was
prevented from providing Medicaid coverage to persons who would not
also be eligible for Medicaid in an SSI state. The court disagreed and
held that the Federal Methodology Statute allowed Indiana (and other
section 209(b) states) to use its state plan even if that plan employed a
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1391. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was
not federalized under SSI. Id. §§ 601-617.
19. See, e.g., Darling v. Bowen, 878 F.2d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989). cert. denied sub.
nom. Stangler v. Darling, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1988).
21. Presently, 13 states are § 209(b) states. These states are Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 435.121(a) (1993).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2) (1988).
24. Id.
25. 598 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 1992).
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more liberal income or resource eligibility methodology than those
used in SSI states.2 6
The Indiana Medicaid program was also at issue in Roloff v. Sulli-
van.2 7 As a qualification on the section 209(b) exception, section
209(b) states must perform an "income spend down" when calculating
available income by deducting "incurred expenses for medical care."28
When income spend down is used, a recipient's Medicaid payments
are reduced by the applicant's excess income.2 9 Under Indiana's
Medicaid program, an applicant's income is calculated on the first day
of the month in which application for benefits is made without regard
to any depletions of the applicant's income occurring later in the
month. Thus, an applicant who depleted excess income during the
month of application must wait until the beginning of the next month
to qualify for Medicaid.
The plaintiffs in Roloff argued that Indiana's procedures violated
the Medicaid statute because they were more restrictive than the
state's criteria in effect on January 1, 1972.30 The court, in ruling for
Indiana's procedure, found that the petitioners failed to show that
they were entitled to receive SSI benefits in the month they were de-
nied Medicaid benefits. As a result, the court ruled that section 209(b)
only applied to those applicants entitled to receive SSI benefits under
current federal standards who also would have been entitled to receive
Medicaid benefits under Indiana's plan in effect on January 1, 1972.31
Moreover, the court only approved Indiana's rule to the extent that it
excluded from Medicaid coverage categorically needy persons ineligi-
ble for benefits under the January 1, 1972 plan.3 2
26. Hence, the resource eligibility rule authorizing resource spend-down was found
not to be inconsistent with the rule requiring the applicant's resources to be eval-
uated as of the first day of the month but was merely an additional eligibility
criterion. Id. at 610.
27. 975 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. 42 U.S.C-. § 1396a(f) (West Supp. 1994). Income spend down is the process
whereby an applicant's income is reduced for the purposes of determining Medi-
caid eligibility by the amount of incurred but unpaid medical expenses not cov-
ered by third-party payers. State Medicaid agencies are not required to consider
debt owed by a Medicaid applicant when determining Medicaid eligibility. If a
Medicaid applicant has access to bank account funds, the applicant must apply
those funds toward the outstanding debt. Gill v. Ohio Dep't of Human Serv., No.
60567, 1992 WL 205070 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1992).
29. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.831 (1993).
30. Indiana adopted its "first day of the month" rule in 1984. 470 Ind. Admin. Code
tit. 470, § 9.1-3-17.






With respect to income, Medicaid eligibility hinges upon the
amount of an applicant's available income.3 3 Recent court cases
demonstrate how broadly "available income" is defined.34 For exam-
ple, in Peura v. Mala,3 5 the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory tax
withholdings constitute available income.3 6 Also, one court has re-
cently held that cost of living adjustments (COLA's) to Social Security
payments of recipients residing in section 209(b) states constitute
available income3 7 as does income paid to an ex-spouse for child sup-
port under a divorce decree.3 8 In addition, while the cash value of an
insurance policy has been held to be available for Medicaid eligibility
purposes,3 9 a recent Indiana appellate court has held that the owner
of a life insurance policy with a cash value that places the owner over
the Medicaid eligibility limit can still qualify for Medicaid because the
policy is not considered available income until the proceeds are con-
verted to actual use.4 0 However, the owner-applicant will still be re-
quested to convert the policy to cash.4 1
2. Deeming
Available income can also be "deemed" from the applicant's spouse
to the applicant for Medicaid eligibility purposes.4 2 A maintenance
level of income and resources for the noninstitutionalized spouse is
specified, and any funds exceeding the maintenance level are deemed
available for contribution toward the costs of institutionalization. 43
Medicaid benefits are usually terminated if the noninstitutionalized
spouse fails to contribute any excess. 44
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994).
34. For a discussion of earlier case law on the "available income" issue, see McEowen
and Harl, supra note 5, at notes 37-38.
35. 977 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1992).
36. See also Himes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1993)(stating that mandatory
payroll deductions and court-ordered support payments constitute "available in-
come"); Ross v. Department of Human Serv., 469 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
37. Noland v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1992).
38. Emerson v. Steffen, 959 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1992)(construing Minnesota law).
39. See Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971).
40. Indiana Dep't of Public Welfare v. Teckenbrock, 620 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993).
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.CJ.A § 1396r-5 (West Supp. 1994).
43. Id. § 1396r-5(d) (West Supp. 1994).
44. "Deeming" is subject to many technical rules, and the rules vary between § 209(b)
states and non-§ 209(b) states. For an overview of the deeming rules, see McE-
owen and Harl, supra note 5, at notes 39-75.
[Vol. 73:104
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE
The major exception to the spousal deeming rules is for undue
hardship. 4 5 If the Secretary determines that spousal deeming would
be inequitable, deemed spousal income may be considered unavaila-
ble.46 Absent a showing of undue hardship, however, a state may
deny Medicaid benefits to an institutionalized spouse by deeming in-
come and resources from the community spouse.4 7
3. The "Name-on-the-Check" Rule
An issue closely related to the available income issue involves the
"name-on-the-check" rule. This rule "requires that a Medicaid appli-
cant's eligibility for benefits be based on the amount of money that the
applicant receives each month in his or her name."48 While the term
"income" when used in a federal statute is to be defined in accordance
with state law,4 9 the "name-on-the-check" rule does not recognize
state community property law in its application.50 Instead, the
"name-on-the-check" rule looks only at the amount of income an indi-
vidual actually receives in the individual's own name. Consequently,
if the spouse in whose name all (or a large portion of) income is re-
ceived is institutionalized and a Medicaid application is made, all of
the couple's income will be considered "available" to the institutional-
ized spouse for Medicaid eligibility purposes.5 1
The Tenth Circuit has recently dealt with the issue of the applica-
tion of the "name-on-the-check" rule in a community property state.
In New Mexico Department of Human Services v. Department of
Health and Human Services,52 the court ruled that the Secretary may
not force a community property state to calculate Medicaid eligibility
45. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.734(b)(2) (1993). See also 42 U.S.C_. § 1396r-5 (West Supp.
1994).
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.734(b)(2) (1993). See also 42 U.S.C-.A § 1396r-5 (West Supp.
1994).
47. Bowden v. Delaware Dep't of Health, No. 92A-08-001, 1993 WL 390480 (Del.
1993)(holding no undue hardship where community spouse found to have excess
assets).
48. See, e.g., Washington Dept of Social & Health Serv. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 549, 552
(9th Cir. 1987).
49. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930)(stating that the term "income of" in
a federal tax statute indicates ownership as defined under state law).
50. In a community property jurisdiction, all marital property is owned in common by
the spouses with each spouse owning an undivided one-half interest by reason of
marital status. In community property states, one-half of the earnings of each
spouse are considered owned by the other spouse. Whereas in common law
states, each spouse owns whatever he or she earns. Presently, nine states are
community property jurisdictions. Those states are Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
51. It should be noted that the "name-on-the-checl' rule could produce a favorable
result in community property states in situations where a spouse earning no in-
come is institutionalized.
52. 4 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1993).
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in accordance with the "name-on-the-check" rule.5 3 The court found
the "name-on-the-check" rule to be contrary to state community prop-
erty law and inconsistent with the Medicaid statute.5 4
4. Countable Income v. Actual Income
In addition to income being available to a Medicaid applicant, in-
come must also be countable.55 Only an applicant's income that is re-
ceived in cash or check and is available to meet the applicant's basic
needs is considered income for Medicaid eligibility purposes. 56
There appears to be a split of authority concerning whether items
that were not considered countable income in determining a Medicaid
applicant's eligibility can be considered countable income after eligi-
bility has been established in order to assess the amount the recipient
must contribute toward the cost of the recipient's care. In Lamore v.
Ives,57 the court held that Veteran's benefits, while not considered as
countable income in the eligibility determination, are to be considered
in the post-eligibility phase in determining how much the recipient
must contribute toward the cost of care.58 However, in Ginley v.
White,59 the court held that the identical provision operated to bar
participating states from including in income in the post-eligibility
phase those items that were excluded during the eligibility phase.60
III. ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND
CONSIDERATIONS
Estate planners with elderly clients, clients with medical condi-
tions, or clients whose families have a history of needing long-term
care should carefully consider the available options for minimizing the
financial impact that long-term care can have on the family's wealth
position.61 Arguably, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require
53. Id. at 886.
54. Id.
55. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1104 (1993).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1993)
(stating that income includes food, clothing, shelter, or something that can be
used to obtain food, clothing, or shelter).
57. 977 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 720, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988).
59. Medicare and Medicaid Guide, New Developments (CCH) 40,003 (D. Pa. 1992).
60. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988).
61. Some individuals claim that attorneys who advise clients on how to employ estate
planning techniques to shift assets away from clients facing long-term health
care in order to protect those assets from being spent on such person's medical
care are engaging in unethical conduct. For example, the Ohio Senate Ways and
Means Committee in 1992 considered legislation that would disbar attorneys if
they advised clients on how to transfer assets in order to qualify for Medicaid.
The legislation (Substitute Senate Bill 366) never made it out of committee.
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such a consideration. 62 If, after adequate research, an attorney does
not feel he can competently advise the client on such estate planning
techniques, competent representation requires that the lawyer refer
the client to another attorney better versed in the subject matter.63
1. Exempt Assets
Some assets are exempt from the income and asset restrictions in
the Medicaid law.6 4 The beginning point in counseling clients facing
potential long-term health care and an application for Medicaid is to
arrive at a knowledge of what assets a client may continue to own
without having those assets being counted toward the Medicaid eligi-
bility limits.6 5
Once an individual is institutionalized, that person's home is ex-
empt from the resource calculation if the noninstitutionalized spouse
("community spouse") or a dependent relative continues to live in the
However, advising clients how to legitimately and legally transfer assets and
utilize other estate planning techniques to qualify for Medicaid benefits is good
lawyering, though it may be personally unpalatable to some attorneys. There is
no legal obligation to deplete one's resources paying for one's medical care when
other legal avenues are available. The similarity to tax planning is obvious. In
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934), affd 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
Judge Learned Hand said: "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." In
addition, there may be a two-edged sword at work here-failure to advise a client
on how to qualify for Medicaid might subject an attorney to a malpractice action.
See, e.g., Darke County Bar Assoc. v. Brumbaugh, 602 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio
1992)(holding that a lengthy delay in recertifying client's Medicaid entitlement,
causing client to incur $4,000 debt was sufficient to warrant a six month suspen-
sion from law practice).
62. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client." MODEL RULES OF
PsOFssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1981). In addition, an argument can be made
that attorneys practicing in Iowa are presumed to know the Medicaid laws since,
in Iowa, all citizens are presumed to know and understand the rule against per-
petuities. See Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982).
63. "[C]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFEssIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.1 (1982). See, e.g., Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)(finding an obligation to conduct research and make
informed decisions as to course of conduct, and to refer to specialist if reasonably
skillful practitioner would do so).
64. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210 (1993).
65. Even though the level of assets that may be retained without being subject to the
Medicaid eligibility limits is small, for individuals with small estates and for indi-
viduals who wait until the last minute before contacting their attorney, knowl-
edge of the exempt assets is crucial. In addition, the list of exempt assets may




home. 66 If there is no community spouse or dependent relative, the
home is exempt if the institutionalized individual intends to return to
the home.67 However, if an otherwise exempt home is sold, the pro-
ceeds of sale are not exempt unless used to purchase another home
within three months of the receipt of the proceeds. 68
Household goods and personal items having an equity value of
$2,000 or less 69 as well as the total fair market value of one automo-
bile necessary for employment, medical treatment, or to provide trans-
portation for essential daily activities70 are also exempt resources. If
the automobile is not necessary for one of these reasons, it is excluded
as a resource up to $4,500 in value.71
Other exempt assets include the cash surrender value of life insur-
ance policies with combined face values of $1,500 or less per individ-
ual;72 up to $6,000 of equity in trade or business property essential for
self-support if such property produces a net annual income of at least
six percent of excluded equity;73 and up to $6,000 of equity in nonbusi-
ness property used to produce goods or services for daily activities. 74
Also exempt is up to $1,500 in a designated account or fund
earmarked for burial arrangements 75 and contracts for the purchase
of burial space.76 One exempt asset of particular importance to farm-
ers is disaster relief assistance and any interest earned on such assist-
ance for a period of nine months beginning on the date the assistance
is received. 77
66. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210(a), 416.1212(c) (1993). The home is an exempt resource
regardless of value unless there is income producing property on the home-site
that does not qualify under the home exclusion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1220-
416.1224.
67. Id. § 416.1212(c). Medicaid applicants need not actually own their homes to be
able to exclude the value of a contiguous parcel of real estate that they do own
from the resource calculation. Correll v. Division of Social Serv., 418 S.E.2d 232
(N.C. 1992) (construing North Carolina law).
68. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(d) (1993). In addition, proceeds received from state condem-
nation of a Medicaid recipient's home while the recipient is institutionalized are
exempt. Zeringue v. LaFourche Parish Office, 597 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1992)(deter-
mining that condemnation is an involuntary conversion of house to cash).
69. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210(b), 416.1216(b) (1993).
70. Id. § 416.1218(b)(1)(i-iv) (1993).
71. Id. § 416.1218(b)(2) (1993). If the market value exceeds $4,500, the excess is
counted against the resource limit. Id.
72. Id. § 1230(a) (1993).
73. Id. § 416.1222(a) (1993).
74. Id. § 416.1224 (1993). This type of property includes real estate used to produce
vegetables and livestock for personal consumption in the applicant's household.
Id.
75. Id. § 416.1210(l) (1993).
76. Id. § 416.1231(a)(3) (1993).
77. Id. § 416.1237(a-b) (1993). The assistance must be the result of a catastrophe in
a presidentially declared disaster area. In addition, the initial nine month ex-
emption period can be extended for up to an additional nine months if the recipi-
[Vol. 73:104
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2. Asset Transfers Prior to August 10, 1993
The rules concerning asset transfers have changed significantly
with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA '93).78 OBRA'93 became effective on August 10, 1993, and the
new asset transfer rules apply as of October 1, 1993 to all transfers
made after August 10, 1993.79 Thus, it is important to determine
when a particular transfer was made in order to know which rules
apply.
For transfers occurring on or before August 10, 1993, Medicaid
benefits are denied to individuals if a Medicaid application is made
within thirty months of the transfer, and the transfer was made with
the intent to qualify for Medicaid.80 The time period for benefit denial
is set at the number of months (up to thirty) that would be needed to
spend the uncompensated value of the transferred asset(s) on nursing
home care in the applicant's state or (at state option) in the applicant's
community.8'
Transfers made within thirty months of a Medicaid application
raise a presumption that the transfer was made with the intent to
qualify for Medicaid.S2 The presumption is rebuttable with a showing
of intent to dispose of the assets either at fair market value or that the
transfer was for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid.83
There have been some recent developments concerning the ability
to overcome the presumption that a particular transfer was made with
the intent to qualify for Medicaid.84 The major development concerns
a split of authority on the issue of whether a surviving spouse's waiver
of marital rights to take an elective share of the deceased spouse's es-
tate constitutes a disqualifying asset transfer.
Until 1993, the prevailing view was that a surviving spouse's
waiver to take an elective share did not constitute a disqualifying as-
set transfer.85 Courts reasoned that a disqualifying transfer had not
ent is prevented from making necessary repairs or replacing damaged property
by circumstances beyond the recipient's control. Id. § 416.1237(c) (1993).
78. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107
Stat. 312, 622 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.CA § 1396p(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1994)).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
81. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(B). For example, if a Medicaid applicant transfers an asset
worth $50,000 and receives nothing in return, the uncompensated value of the
transfer is $50,000. If the cost of nursing home care in the transferor's state or
community is $2,000 per month, the Medicaid ineligibility period will be 25
months ($50,000 + 2,000) beginning from the date of application.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
83. Id.
84. For a review of prior cases on this issue, see McEowen and Harl, supra note 5 at
notes 191-218.
85. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hill, 457 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
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occurred because the surviving spouse's rights to a statutory share did
not automatically vest upon the decedent's death absent an order from
the probate court.8 6 However in Hinschberger v. Griggs County Social
Services,8 7 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a surviving
spouse's release of his interest in his wife's estate constituted a dis-
qualifying transfer for less than fair market value to the extent the
release was less than the surviving spouse's interest in the estate.8 8
Under North Dakota law, the surviving spouse was entitled to an elec-
tive share of $12,855 plus an additional $5,000 allowance for exempt
property, for a total elective share of $17,855. The surviving spouse,
however, only took $14,000. Consequently, the court found a disquali-
fying transfer of $3,855.
3. Asset Transfers After August 10, 1993
As previously mentioned, OBRA '93 significantly changed the rules
regarding asset transfers.8 9 While the new asset transfer rules apply
as of October 1, 1993 to all transfers made after August 10, 1993, some
states may need to draft legislation to come into compliance with the
requirements of the new federal law. Depending on a particular
state's legislative sessions, the new rules may not apply in some states
until some time after October 1, 1993.90
Under OBRA '93, the look-back period for asset transfers has been
extended to thirty-six months.91 The ineligibility period remains set
at the number of months that otherwise would be required to spend
the uncompensated value of the transferred assets on nursing home
care in the applicant's state (or the community at the state's option).
However, the ineligibility period is no longer capped at any particular
number of months.92 Transfers occurring outside of the thirty-six
month look-back period need not be reported to the state Medicaid
agency. Also, Medicaid eligibility can be immediate if all other re-
quirements are met. But, all transfers made during the look-back pe-
86. See, e.g., Stamer v. Estate of Wright, 701 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Estate
of Savage v. Pogue, 650 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
87. 499 N.W.2d 876 (N.D. 1993).
88. Id. at 882.
89. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90. This creates a quandary for practitioners attempting to counsel clients with long-
term care needs. Since it is impossible to know beforehand whether particular
state legislation will be retroactive, the prudent path to take would be to assume
the new law became effective October 1, 1993 and applies to transfers made after
August 10, 1993.
91. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,611(a)(1),
107 Stat. 312, 622 (1993)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 1994)).
92. Id. § 13611(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C-A.
§ 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1994)).
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riod must be added together to calculate the number of months of
ineligibility.9 3
The previous Medicaid law contained a waiver provision that could
operate to set aside an otherwise prohibited transfer if application of
the transfer rule would cause "undue hardship."94 Yet the waiver was
seldom used. Under the new law, the Secretary is required to estab-
lish criteria for states to follow in establishing procedures for permit-
ting waiver of transfer penalties where undue hardship would
result.95 It appears that Congress intends for states to use their dis-
cretion to protect individuals where application of the penalty would
cause undue hardship and run counter to the purpose of the Medicaid
programs. Further, it appears that by mandating state procedures
and requiring the Secretary to set criteria, Congress wants more waiv-
ers to be granted.96
The new law also contains several exceptions to the transfer rules.
The new law maintains the prior law's exception for transfers between
spouses or to minor or disabled children of the transferor9 7 as well as
the exception for transferring the home to caretaker children and cer-
tain siblings of the Medicaid applicant.98 Moreover, transfers to
trusts created solely for the benefit of disabled children of the Medi-
caid applicant or to certain trusts created for a disabled child or
grandchild under age sixty-five are exempt from the transfer rules.99
Another significant change in the new law concerns the treatment
of jointly held property.OO Under the new law, any action of a co-
owner of jointly held property that reduces an applicant's ownership
interest in or control of an asset will be considered a disqualifying
transfer.O1 This new provision also covers property owned jointly as
93. Id. § 13611(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396p(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994)).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D) (1988).
95. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611(a)(1) 107
Stat. 312, 622 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(2)(D) (West
Supp. 1994)).
96. Planners may want to test the availability of an undue hardship waiver in situa-
tions where it seems applicable.
97. 42 U.S.CAL § 1396p(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
98. Id. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iii-iv) (West Supp. 1994).
99. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611(a)(1),
107 Stat. 312, 622 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (West
Supp. 1994)). However, the "under age 65" language raises an important ques-
tion. Must the trust be funded while the beneficiary is under age 65, or must the
trust be terminated before the beneficiary reaches age 65? If the trust must ter-
minate before the beneficiary reaches age 65, the exception may effectively be
gutted since all trusts must have remaindermen. Perhaps directing payment of





tenants-in-common and as tenants-by-the-entirety as well as property
titled in the survivorship form.102
4. Trusts Prior to August 10, 1993
Before OBRA '93, most trust Medicaid planning involved creating
a discretionary trust as opposed to a support trust.1 0 3 Planners would
carefully draft language into the trust document explicitly evidencing
the settlor's intent to give the trustee complete discretion to distribute
trust income and principal. Similar language was employed to assure
that the settlor's intent was to supplement rather than supplant pub-
lic benefits otherwise available.1 0 4
102. Id. It is uncertain whether a Medicaid applicant will be permitted to prove lack
of contribution to the jointly held asset in order to establish lack of an ownership
interest. An example would be the following. For federal estate tax purposes,
I.R.C. § 2040 (West 1993) includes in a decedent's gross estate property that the
decedent owned in joint tenancy except to the extent it can be proved that consid-
eration was provided by the surviving joint tenant(s). This is commonly referred
to as the "consideration furnished" rule.
103. A support trust directs the trustee to distribute trust income or principal as nec-
essary for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959). A discretionary trust gives the trustee complete
discretion to distribute all, some, or none of the trust income or principal to the
beneficiary as the trustee deems necessary. Id. § 155.
104. For example, Trust Co. of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv., 825
P.2d 1295 (Okla. 1991), involved a trust created for the primary purpose of pro-
viding nonmedical support which contained a provision giving the trustee discre-
tion to provide medical care if the beneficiary ceased to qualify for medical
assistance programs. Since the trust instrument clearly directed the trustee to
use the trust income for the support of the beneficiary and gave the trustee no
discretion to distribute or accumulate income not necessary for the beneficiary's
care, the trust was not deemed an available resource for Medicaid eligibility
purposes.
Similarly, a trust giving the trustee complete discretion to distribute trust
assets and explicitly evidencing the settlor's intent to supplement rather than
supplant government financial assistance was held not to be an available asset in
In re Leona Carlisle Trust, 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). See also Ala-
bama Medicaid Agency v. Primo, 579 So. 2d 1355 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)(finding
trust funds not an available resource where access to principal was restricted and
distributions made at sole discretion of trustees).
However, the settlor's intent may not be followed with respect to a "trigger
trust" whereby trust income and corpus is to be paid to the beneficiary while the
beneficiary is not institutionalized, but such payments are to be suspended upon
the beneficiary's placement in a nursing home. In Arkansas Dep't of Human
Serv. v. Walters, 866 S.W.2d 823 (Ark. 1993), the court applied a state statute
retroactively to render a "trigger trust" void as a matter of public policy to pre-
serve the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program. Id. at 826.
The settlor's intent to create a discretionary trust rather than a support trust
was at issue in the recent Kansas Supreme Court case of Meyers v. Kansas Dep't
of Social and Rehabilitation Serv., 866 P.2d 1052 (1994). In Meyers, the decedent
executed a will which provided for a trust for the care, support, and maintenance
of her son. The decedent's son had been receiving public medical assistance from
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Obviously, great care had to be exercised so as to not create a
"Medicaid Qualifying Trust" (MQT).105 Amounts included in a MQT
were considered to be available to a Medicaid applicant to the maxi-
mum extent possible.06
As for discretionary trusts, the MQT provisions provided that if a
trustee had discretion to make payments, then the sum payable by the
the state of Kansas before the decedents death and before the funding of the
trust. After the decedents death, the beneficiary applied for Medicaid assistance
but was denied benefits because the state Medicaid agency claimed that the bene-
ficiary had resources in excess of the applicable benefit eligibility level. In other
words, the state Medicaid agency held that the trust assets were considered to be
available to the beneficiary to meet his medical needs. Id. at 1053. The pertinent
language of the decedent's testamentary trust at issue in the case was as follows:
"B) During my son's lifetime, my trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest,
collect the income there from [sic] any [sic] pay over so much or all the net income
and principal to my son as my trustee deems advisable for his care, support,
maintenance, emergencies and welfare." Id. at 1054.
The state Medicaid agency maintained that the decedent's trust was a support
trust containing mandatory language requiring the trustee to inquire into the
basic support needs of the beneficiary and provide for those needs. The court
disagreed with the state Medicaid agency's position and held the trust to be a
discretionary trust with language giving the trustee full discretion to decide
whether payments from the trust income or principal were advisable. The court
held that the trust language tied payment of both income and principal to a de-
termination of need and to the discretionary language "as my trustee deems ad-
visable." Id. at 1055, 1059.
Conversely, the court held that the nondiscretionary language of "shall" per-
tained primarily to the management functions of the trust and did not control or
override the discretionary language of "as my trustee deems advisable," which
pertains to whether payment of net income or principal would be made at all and,
if so, the amount and purpose of any such payment. In addition, the court stated
that its holding would appear to be consistent with the intent of the decedent
since provisions in the trust directed the trustee at the death of the decedent's
son to distribute the principal and any undistributed net income to the remain-
derman. The court felt that this language indicated the testator's intention not to
necessarily exhaust trust principal. Id. at 1058-59.
105. A "Medicaid Qualifying Trust" is:
a trust, or similar legal device, established (other than by will) by an
individual (or an individual's spouse) under which the individual may be
the beneficiary of all or part of the payment, from the trust and the dis-
tribution of such payments is determined by one or more trustees who
are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution
to the individual.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2) (1988).
106. Id. § 1396a(k)(1). In addition, the MQT provisions could not be avoided by termi-
nating the trust beneficiary's rights in the trust assets upon the beneficiary's in-
stitutionalization. See, e.g., Gulick v. Department of Health and Rehab. Serv.,
615 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, a trust directing that the
trustee "shall" make income and principal payments to a Medicaid applicant/ben-
eficiary constituted an MQT. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Department of Health and
Social Serv., 485 N.W.2d 290 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
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trustee is available even if it was not actually distributed.107 How-
ever, if trust principal could not be paid out within the trustee's dis-
cretion, then it was not available under the MQT rules.308 Therefore,
to avoid the application of the MQT rules, it was important to avoid
drafting a trust which tied the payment of income to a determination
of the beneficiary's need or which evidenced the grantor's intent to use
trust income to prevent the beneficiary from becoming destitute. A
trust drafted in this manner was considered available for Medicaid
eligibility purposes.109
While the MQT rules were clearly aimed at discouraging the use of
discretionary trusts, there did exist several possibilities for avoiding
the restrictions on sheltering assets through the use of discretionary
trusts.11 0 Several of these methods have been the subject of recent
cases.111 One exception to the MQT rules exists for trusts in which
the settlor and the beneficiary are not spouses. However, some states
have attempted to limit the usefulness of these types of trusts by de-
claring them to be in violation of state fraudulent conveyance statutes
or in violation of public policy. 112 One such recent case occurred in
New York in In re Cangelosi.113 There, the court refused to permit the
transfer of proceeds remaining from the compromise of a medical mal-
practice action into a trust for the benefit of a mentally retarded bene-
ficiary. The court opined that since the purpose of the trust would be
to permit the beneficiary to achieve Medicaid eligibility by diverting
ownership from the beneficiary, the policy of the New York Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law would be violated.114
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(3)(B) (1988). See also Viera v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, No. CV. 90-04381515 1991 WL 273329 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11,
1991) (holding that funds in an irrevocable spendthrift trust were to be consid-
ered as an asset even though the trustees had complete discretion in disbursing
the funds).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2) (1988).
109. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sec. of Social & Rehab. Serv. v. Jackson, 822 P.2d 1033
(Kan. 1991). There were, however, several methods available for granting a
trustee discretion without rendering principal available for Medicaid eligibility
purposes. For example, distributions could be made subject to third-party con-
sent. See Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990). Also, distributions
could hinge upon the occurrence of certain conditions on the theory that the bene-
ficiary had only an expectancy interest. See Siegal v. Kizer, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
110. For a more complete discussion of the situations in which the MQT rules do not
apply, see McEowen and Harl, supra note 5 at notes 266-91 and accompanying
text.
111. One such method was permitting distribution in the event of extraordinary cir-
cumstances with the written consent of all remaindermen. Pollak v. Department
of Health & Rehab. Serv., 579 So. 2d 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
112. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30(4)(D) (West 1992).
113. 589 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
114. Id. at 279.
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Another exception to the MQT rules has been the ability of a
guardian to petition the probate court for protective orders transfer-
ring all of the incapacitated ward's income to a trust. Courts have
viewed these trusts as not created by the beneficiary, and thus not
subject to the MQT rules.'1 5
Recent developments demonstrate a growing unwillingness of
courts to permit the creation of these type of trusts to avoid the Medi-
caid transfer rules. In Pollak v. Department of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Services,116 the court held that a court-created trust will be
considered an MQT in states with a medically needy program when
both the trust provisions place no limitation on the trustee's discretion
to disburse trust assets, and the trust assets remaining after the bene-
ficiary's death will not go to reimburse the state Medicaid agency."17
An Ohio court has ruled that settlement proceeds received by a guard-
ian and held in bank deposits subject to withdrawal only on the order
of the probate court were available to the Medicaid applicant for eligi-
bility purposes." 8
Another method of avoiding the MQT restrictions is through use of
a testamentary trust.119 Two recent Pennsylvania cases point out
that careful drafting is still necessary to avoid having the trust
treated as an available asset. For instance, in Commonwealth Bank
and Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare,120 funds
contained in a testamentary trust for the decedent mother were held
to be available to the mother for Medicaid eligibility purposes because
the trust made no specific reference to supplement public benefits,
and the remaindermen were only to benefit if funds remained avail-
able. Conversely, trust funds contained in a trust created for two
equal beneficiaries, where one beneficiary received public benefits
before the testator's death but after the will was executed, were held
115. See, e.g., Miller v. barra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990); Kegal v. State, 830 P.2d
563 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). See also Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d 379 (Conn.
1993)(stating that act of conservator in creating trust is not legally attributable
to the ward).
116. 579 So. 2d 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
117. Id. at 788.
118. Gorenflo v. Ohio Dep't of Human Serv., 611 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). In
Gorenflo, the court determined that jurisdiction over the ward's funds is imposed
by statute and is not evidence that the court was acting as trustee. In addition,
the court had previously released funds on the guardian's petition. However, in
Young v. Department of Public Welfare, M-6355, Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., (Dec. 17,
1993), the court upheld a probate court determination that the trustee of a sup-
plemental needs trust did not have discretion to distribute trust corpus or income
to the primary beneficiary where such distributions would make the beneficiary
ineligible for Medicaid.
119. Under the MQT definition, a "Medicaid Qualifying Trust" is defined in part as "a
trust, or similar legal device, established (other than by will)..." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(k)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
120. 598 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 1991).
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to indicate that the testator did not intend that these trust assets in-
terfere with the beneficiary's eligibility for public benefits.121
5. Trusts After August 10, 1993
Medicaid trust planning has been severely restricted with the pas-
sage of OBRA '93.122 Notwithstanding, as with the asset transfer
rules, the new rules applying to trusts may not take effect in some
states until some time in 1995.123
Under the new law, the MQT concept is eliminated.124 In its place,
a trust is defined as "any legal instrument or device that is similar to a
trust."'12 5 While annuities are not included in the definition of a trust,
the new law gives the Secretary the authority to establish regulations
that would include annuities under the trust provisions.126
The major change with respect to trusts concerns the assets of non-
testamentary trusts created or funded by a Medicaid applicant or such
person's spouse. These assets will be considered available to the ap-
plicant and/or the applicant's spouse to the extent the applicant de-
rives any benefit from them.127 In addition, court-created trusts or
trusts created by anyone acting on behalf of the applicant or the appli-
cant's spouse will be considered to have been created by the applicant
or the applicant's spouse for eligibility purposes.128 These new trust
rules apply regardless of both the trust's purpose and any restrictions
placed upon the distribution of trust assets.' 29 No longer will practi-
tioners be able to draft language into trust instruments evidencing the
settlor's intent to supplement rather than supplant public benefits.
Consequently, the major effect (and purpose) of the new trust rules
will be to foreclose the use of income-only discretionary trusts, a major
tool in Medicaid planning.
The new rules are not nearly as clear in their application to irrevo-
cable trusts. The corpus of an irrevocable trust that benefits the gran-
tor (grantor retained interest trusts, or GRITs) may be considered
available to the grantor for Medicaid eligibility purposes if the grantor
121. Snyder v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, 598 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1991).
122. Transfer of Assets; Treatment of Certain Trusts, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107
Stat. 312, 622-27 (1993)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1994)).
123. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
124. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611(b), 107
Stat. 312, 622-27 (1993)(to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)).
However, the MQT rules apply to trusts created and funded on or before August
10, 1993.
125. Id. § 13611(b)(6), 107 Stat. 312, 626.
126. Id.





subsequently applies for benefits. The new law treats any income that
is paid to the grantor-applicant as causing the underlying corpus gen-
erating that income to be available.130 The final language as passed
by the Senate states as follows:
(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust could
be made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the corpus from
which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment to the individual
could be made shall be considered resources available to the individual .... 131
The language which causes confusion over how income will be counted
concerns the phrase, "or the income on the corpus from which." A re-
view of the legislative history behind this language reveals that the
Congressional intent was to bar income-only trusts. 3 2
Arguably, trust income will be counted as an asset. This interpre-
tation would effectively cause principal of an income-only trust to be
counted as an available asset. However, if trust income is counted as
an asset for eligibility purposes, the possibility exists that an income
stream from an income-only trust should be capitalized to place a
value on it for either eligibility or transfer disqualification purposes.
If this is the case, income-only irrevocable trusts are essentially
worthless as a Medicaid planning tool.
An argument can also be made that the final language will treat
the trust corpus as an available asset only to the extent payment may
be made from the trust corpus, and the trust income as available only
to the extent payment is made from the income. If this proves to be an
acceptable interpretation, GRITs retain some usefulness.
A third approach would be to count income as income and re-
sources as resources. This approach seems to fit with the statutory
language, and seems to indicate that to the extent payments are made
to the individual, they will be treated as income. Alternatively, to the
extent payments are made to a third party, they will be treated as an
asset. Arguably, under this approach, the establishment of an irrevo-
cable trust with the grantor reserving an income interest for life but
with no corpus being distributed to the grantor will not cause the
corpus to be an available resource for Medicaid eligibility purposes
once the applicable asset transfer period has passed. If this approach
is accepted, income-only irrevocable trusts cause no problems unless
payments are made to third parties, regardless of whether such pay-
ment comes from income or principal. Given the uncertainty sur-
rounding income-only trusts, the best approach may be to avoid
drafting income-only trusts altogether.
130. Id. § 13611(b)(B)(i), 107 Stat. 312, 625.
131. Id.
132. For instance, the House Budget Committee report stated that irrevocable trusts
which benefited the grantor may be considered available to the individual. Addi-
tionally, the corpus of the trust shall be considered available to the individual.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-11, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 207 (1993).
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The new law also contains a provision construing any payment
from an irrevocable trust that benefits the grantor to anyone other
than the grantor-applicant as a disqualifying transfer.133 The appli-
cable look-back period for such transfers is thirty-six months.134 Yet,
a sixty month look-back period applies to revocable trusts as well as
irrevocable trusts that do not benefit the grantor (an irrevocable non-
retained interest trust).135 Thus, for trusts subject to the sixty month
ineligibility period, there will be a requirement to report trust transac-
tions even though the applicant did not retain any interest in the
trust.1 3 6
The new trust rules apply regardless of both the trust's purposel 3 7
and whether the trustee has or exercises any discretion over the trust
assets.13 8 They also operate irrespective of any restrictions on mak-
ing distributions or the use of trust distributions.139 However, states
are required to establish procedures for waiving application of the
trust rules where undue hardship would occur.14 0
OBRA '93 also contains several exceptions to the new trust
rules.141 Trusts established by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian,
or court for the benefit of a disabled person under age sixty-five are
exempt from application of the new rules if all remaining amounts in
the trust upon the beneficiary's death will be distributed to the state
Medicaid agency in reimbursement for any payment made on the ben-
eficiary's behalf during life.142 In addition, trusts established in
states that limit Medicaid eligibility to persons with income less than
300% of the poverty level and whose income consists solely of pension,
social security, other income, and accumulated trust income, as long
as the state receives all trust funds remaining upon the grantor's
death, are exempt. 143 Similarly, the trust rules do not apply to trusts
established and managed by a non-profit association for disabled ben-
eficiaries as long as separate accounts are maintained for each benefi-
133. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13611(b)(3)(A)
(iii), (b)(3)(B)(ii), 107 Stat. 312, 625 (1993)(to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(k)).
134. Id. § 13611(a)(B)(i), 107 Stat. 312, 622.
135. Id.
136. Thus, the prudent approach may be to give away assets outright to desired indi-
viduals (which would be subject to a 36 month ineligibility period) rather than
create an irrevocable trust for the benefit of such persons.
137. Transfer of Assets; Treatment of Certain Trusts, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13611(b)(2)(c)(i), 107 Stat. 312, 624 (1993)(to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(k)).
138. Id. § 13611(b)(2)(C)(ii).
139. Id. § 13611(b)(2)(C)(iii-iv).
140. Id. § 13611(b)(5), 107 Stat. 312, 626.
141. Id. § 13611(b)(4), 107 Stat. 312, 625-26.
142. Id. § 13611(b)(4)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 625.
143. Id. § 13611(b)(4)(B), 107 Stat. 312, 625.
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ciary.' 44 Likewise, any amounts remaining in a beneficiary's trust
account upon death must be distributed to the state Medicaid agency
in full reimbursement for all benefits paid to the beneficiary during
life.145
6. Income-Producing Property Used in Trade or Business
A specific estate planning technique different from the traditional
asset and trust planning concepts involves income-producing property
used in a trade or business.' 46 Under a 1990 amendment to the Medi-
caid law, all income-producing property used in a trade or business
can be excluded from countable resources for Medicaid eligibility pur-
poses.' 47 This is a very important planning tool for farm and ranch
clients because the amendment applies to all property used in a trade
or business that is essential to a person's self-support regardless of the
value or rate of return.' 48 Thus, since trade or business property in
current use is exempt, such property can theoretically be transferred
without penalty.
In order to exempt income-producing trade or business property, it
is imperative that an actual trade or business be established.' 49 At a
minimum, this requires the production of tax returns, a description of
the trade or business including a description of the business assets,
the number of years the business has been operating, the identity of
the co-owners, if any, and the estimated gross and net earnings.150
Caution should be exercised if the business has been in operation for
less than one year.' 5 '
The trade or business exception has favorable implications for
farmers and ranchers. Under the amendment, the entire farm and
ranch real estate, livestock, buildings, and equipment can potentially
be excluded from the Medicaid applicant's available resources.152 Ad-
144. Id. § 13611(b)(4)(C)(i-ii).
145. Id. § 13611(b)(4)(C)(iv), 107 Stat. 312, 626.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
147. Id. (effective May 1, 1990). The amendment specifically mentions machinery and
livestock of a farmer that is used in a trade or business by such person. Id.
148. Id. However, § 209(b) states are not required to adopt the amendment. Several
significant farm states are § 209(b) states. These are: Illinois, Indiana, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
149. The term trade or business, for income tax purposes, is generally defined as an
activity undertaken with the expectation of making a profit. See, e.g., Commis-
sioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 34 (1987).
150. Since there is no finite definition for what constitutes a trade or business, the
more information that an individual can produce evidencing indicia of a business
and a profit motive, the better.
151. Short-term operation makes it difficult to establish the factors necessary to show
the existence of a trade or business.
152. The Secretary is directed to not establish a limitation on essential trade or busi-
ness property. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(3) (1988).
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ditionally, liquid resources used in the trade or business may be ex-
cluded from countable resources without limit.'53
While the trade or business exception does not apply to rental
property, leased land, or other non-business income-producing prop-
erty,' 54 up to $6,000 of equity value of such property can be excluded
from countable resources if the property produces a net annual return
equal to at least six percent of the excluded equity.155 If the property
produces less than a six percent return, the exclusion can apply only if
the lower return is for reasons beyond the individual's control (such as
crop failure or illness), and there is a reasonable expectation that the
property will again produce a six percent return. 56
7. Retained Life Interests
Another Medicaid planning technique involves the use of retained
life interests. A retained life interest is a limited interest in property
lasting only for the lifetime of the life tenant.' 57 Under the Internal
Revenue Code, a transfer of property with the retention of the use,
possession, right of the income, or other enjoyment of the property will
result in inclusion of the property in the transferor's gross estate.'5 8
The benefit of having the property included in the transferor's gross
estate is that, upon death, the heirs will receive an income tax basis
equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the date of the
decedent's death.'59 This is likely to be significantly higher than the
153. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1220 (1993). See also Miller v. Ives, 780 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me.
1991)(noting that without excluding liquid resources the trade or business exclu-
sion would be illusory). The ability to exclude liquid resources is critical to farm
and ranch operations due to the seasonal nature of the business and the need to
keep large amounts of cash on hand to pay operating expenses.
154. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1222 (1993).
155. Id. Any portion of the equity value exceeding $6,000 is not excluded. For exam-
ple, assume Steve is a lawyer who enjoys cattle ranching on the weekends. Steve
owns a small ranch, three acres of which is his homesite, and an additional 40
acres not connected to the home. There are two corrals and two animal shelters
located on the 40 acres. Steve also owns various pieces of ranch equipment and
horses that are necessary for his ranching activities.
The value of Steve's home and the three acres on which it sets will be excluded
under the home exclusion for Medicaid eligibility purposes. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1212 (1993). All of the other ranch assets, including the land, will be
lumped together to determine if Steve's total equity in these items is less than
$6,000 and if the annual rate of return is at least six percent of Steve's equity.
The land and buildings are valued at $4,000, and the other ranching items are
valued at $1,500. Steve sells cattle which nets him more than six percent for the
year. Since the ranch assets have a total value of less than $6,000, and Steve's
net return exceeded six percent for the year in question, all of the ranching items
will be exempt.
156. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1222 (1993); I.R.C. § 2036 (West Supp. 1993).
157. I.R.C. § 2036 (West Supp. 1994).
158. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (West Supp. 1994).
159. I.R.C. § 1015 (West 1993).
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decedent's basis in the property. Even though the property is included
in the transferor's gross estate, most state Medicaid eligibility rules
treat a lifetime right to use and occupy as exempt.160
For farm and ranch families, the Medicaid planning strategy may
consist of transferring the farm to the children in full with the chil-
dren then renting the farm back to the parents. The parents would
then act as tenants under a lease with the children. For example, in
Estate of Nicol v. Commissioner,'6 ' a mother rented her farm to her
daughter under a crop-share lease and then later conveyed the farm to
the daughter while continuing to receive rental payments. The court
ruled that this type of arrangement constituted a retained life es-
tate.16 2 In order to insure inclusion in the decedent's gross estate and
receive a stepped-up basis, the lease must not end at any time before
death, and the lease consideration must be below fair market value.
Similarly, in Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner,163 the court found an
implied agreement of retained enjoyment sufficient to require inclu-
sion of the residence in the parent's estate where the parent made a
lifetime transfer to a child but continued to reside in the residence.
There are several issues that must be considered when using re-
tained life interests. The possibility of death or disability of the life
tenant should be considered.' 64 Also, the possibility of waste by a life
tenant may create divisive family disputes or even litigation. Finally,
bankruptcy of the remaindermen may make the property subject to
creditor claims.
8. Medicaid Retirement Planning
Quite often, clients presenting questions about Medicaid are at or
near retirement age. As a result, practitioners need a working knowl-
edge of how typical retirement plans fit into the Medicaid planning
picture. The common scenario for non-farm clients consists of an indi-
vidual who is retiring and must select whether to withdraw from a
qualified pension plan or choose an annuity option.165
Funds rolled over from a qualified plan to an Individual Retire-
ment Account (IRA) are available for Medicaid eligibility purposes.166
In addition, most states require liquidation of Keogh Plans and the
160. See, e.g., NEB. ADuIN. R. & REc. § 2-009.0788 (1992).
161. 56 T.C. 179 (1971).
162. Id. at 181.
163. 98 T.C. 594 (1992).
164. This problem can probably be overcome, however, with the use of a properly
drafted financial durable power of attorney.
165. For farm clients, the typical scenario is for the parents to be approaching retire-
ment and desiring to sell the operation and use the proceeds for retirement.
166. Once the funds are rolled over into an IRA, the individual has the ability to liqui-
date the account, thereby making the funds available for Medicaid eligibility pur-
poses. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994).
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proceeds to be "spent-down" to achieve Medicaid eligibility.167 There-
fore, the general rule concerning availability requires that if the Medi-
caid applicant or the applicant's spouse can withdraw or liquidate a
fund, the fund is available to the applicant for Medicaid eligibility pur-
poses.168 Neither federal nor state Medicaid regulations define "quali-
fied pension plans." Arguably, these plans constitute an unavailable
resource for Medicaid eligibility purposes because the applicant is not
able to liquidate them.
Before OBRA '93, there existed the possibility that pension plans
could be construed as MQT's.169 Under the old law, an MQT was de-
fined as a "trust or similar legal device... and... distribution... is
determined by one or more trustees who are permitted to exercise any
discretion with respect to the distribution to the individual."170 The
language "similar legal device" and "trustees who are permitted to ex-
ercise any discretion" raises a question as to whether funds handled
by a fiduciary would become available for Medicaid eligibility pur-
poses. For instance, a pension plan trustee with authority to invest
funds allowing the beneficiary to benefit in any way would seemingly
cause the funds to be treated as an available asset. With the elimina-
tion of the MQT concept under OBRA '93, it remains unsettled as to
how pension plans will be treated for Medicaid eligibility purposes.
Practitioners have several planning options with respect to pen-
sion plans. One method might be to have the client purchase an annu-
ity.1 7 1 The purchase of an annuity is not an asset transfer but rather
a purchase for value. Thus, an annuity purchase should only be a pro-
hibited asset transfer to the extent it is for less than fair market
value. 172
When dealing with qualified pension plans, planners may want to
consider rolling funds in those plans over into an annuity or an "in-
pay status." If the funds have already been distributed and rolled over
167. Since liquidation will make the funds available for Medicaid eligibility purposes,
the excess funds will need to be spent down to the applicable level. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994).
168. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994). However, there are exceptions in
some states. In Massachusetts, IRA's are fully available, and Keogh plans are
available only if the applicant is self-employed and is the plan's sole participant.
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 106, § 505.160(c) (1992).
169. OBRA '93 eliminated the concept of the MQT. See supra note 124 and accompa-
nying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2) (1988).
171. An annuity is a series of payments of a fixed amount for a specified number of
years.
172. Another planning method might be to purchase a guaranteed term irrevocable
annuity. If this is done, planners should ensure that the issuing company has the
highest possible rating and that the client obtains written disclosures as to the
inability to guarantee the issuing company's performance.
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into an IRA, planners may want to consider rolling over into an IRA
irrevocable term annuity.
9. Minority Business Interests
Practitioners have another available weapon in the Medicaid plan-
ning arsenal for those clients owning stock in a closely held family
corporation. Once a Medicaid application is made, the applicant is re-
quired to liquidate all non-exempt available resources and then use
the funds received upon liquidation to pay for the applicant's medical
care (down to a specified limit) before Medicaid benefits will be re-
ceived.' 7 3 However, most state Medicaid laws will exempt otherwise
non-exempt property if the applicant can show an inability to liqui-
date after a good faith attempt to do so.17 4
The appropriate Medicaid planning strategy for a client who is the
holder of closely held stock in a family owned corporation may be to
work the potential Medicaid applicant into a minority position by
making a series of gifts during life outside of the applicable look-back
period until the applicant is in a minority position. Then, the strate-
gist should argue that the applicant is no longer able to sell the stock
and therefore should be immediately eligible for Medicaid benefits.175
This strategy allows the practitioner to preserve the asset in question
for the applicant and the applicant's family.
Another benefit of having a potential Medicaid applicant hold a mi-
nority interest in otherwise available assets is that such property can
be valued at a discount in the person's estate upon death.176 Property
is generally included in a decedent's gross estate at its fair market
value.177 Typically, fair market value is determined as the price at
which a willing buyer and a willing seller would arrive, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or sell.178 For closely held stock, how-
ever, there are no available selling prices or bid or ask prices in an
established public market. Consequently, such factors as the percent
of the stock in proportion to the entire outstanding stock of the corpo-
ration and the degree of the control represented by such stock become
important.17 9
173. See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of this procedure.
174. Such property is considered to be unavailable to the applicant for Medicaid eligi-
bility purposes. See 42 U.S.C-A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994).
175. The author has proposed this strategy to the legal counsel for the Nebraska state
Medicaid agency. The Agency's counsel responded that if there was an inability
to sell the property or force a liquidation due to a minority position, the state
agency would not be able to count those assets as available to the applicant for
Medicaid eligibility purposes.
176. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. 1514 (CCH) (1991).
177. I.R.C. § 2031 (West 1993).
178. 26 C.F.R. § 20,2031-1(b) (1993).
179. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(c)(as amended in 1976).
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Minority discounts play an important role in the valuation of a
closely held business. A minority discount is routinely available for
interests not actively traded once it is shown that the owner of the
interest could not control the business.180 This Medicaid planning ap-
proach not only preserves the asset for the Medicaid applicant and the
applicant's heirs, but once the applicant dies, a substantial valuation
discount is received in the applicant's estate.1 8
10. Long-term Care Insurance
In general, long-term care insurance may be a viable option for fi-
nancing long-term home care and nursing home costs.' 8 2 Before rec-
ommending the purchase of long-term care insurance, practitioners
must gather several important items of information from the client.
Most importantly, the determination must be made that the client is
underwritable.18 3 If the client can obtain long-term care insurance,
the next question is whether such insurance can be obtained economi-
cally.18 4 Practitioners must also assess an individual client's personal
180. The discount is applied through a three step process. First, the value of the en-
tire enterprise is determined. Second, the proportionate share of enterprise value
attributable to the interest in question is determined. Third, the proportionate
value is then reduced by the minority discount.
181. Presently, closely held stock is discounted approximately 25% based upon the
minority position. Until recently, the IRS vigorously opposed minority discounts.
However, the Commissioner essentially surrendered in January of 1993. Rev.
RUl. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B. 13. In Rev. RUl. 93-12, the Commissioner stated that
the Service will ignore the aggregation of the interests in the hands of the donor
before the transfer and the sibling relationship of the donees. In addition, the
IRS will no longer seek to defeat minority discounts by arguing for attribution
between family members.
A separate "marketability discount" may also be available. This type of dis-
count refers to an asset that would, as a practical matter, be difficult to market.
In a recent case, a 15% marketability discount was allowed. See, e.g., Estate of
Bennett v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 1816 (CCH) (1993). For minority interests,
both a minority discount and a lack of marketability discount will typically be
allowed. See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981);
Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. 1514 (CCH) (1991). Thus, the
total available discount for lack of marketability and minority position is approxi-
mately 40%.
182. The Health Insurance Association of America estimated that as of June 1990,
1.65 million long-term care policies had been sold by 134 insurers. Long-Term
Care Insurance: A Market Update, HIAA RESEARCH BULETIN (Jan., 1991).
183. The determination as to whether the client is underwritable will depend upon the
client's age and physical condition.
184. In general, for younger individuals, insurance will be more freely available at a
comparative low annual premium which can be "locked in" as long as the insur-
ance is maintained (and as long as the insurer does not effect a rate increase).
However, the amount of daily benefits selected is unlikely to be adequate if and
when the client files for benefits. Consequently, a younger individual may wish
to purchase an inflation protection rider. Practitioners must note that the proper
policy is not a policy offering the most comprehensive benefits, but one that offers
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feelings about Medicaid and asset preservation. If the client objects to
receiving Medicaid benefits, then the leading alternative currently
available is long-term insurance. Similarly, if the client assigns a
high priority to preserving assets for inheritance, long-term care in-
surance is a worthwhile means to this end.1s5 The amount of a client's
assets that would be subject to depletion upon an application for Medi-
caid is also important. For example, if a particular client is married
and all or nearly all of the individual's assets can be sheltered using
various Medicaid planning techniques and available allowances, then
long-term care insurance is not a high priority.186
If, after careful evaluation, it is advisable for the client to purchase
a long-term care insurance policy, planners should note that the long-
term care policy need not provide "first dollar" coverage extending
throughout a nursing home stay to satisfy the entire bill. One tech-
nique that can be used to make long-term care insurance more afford-
able includes having the purchaser accept a longer waiting period
before policy benefits commence. The same effect can be obtained by
having the client purchase a policy that pays a smaller indemnity
amount or contains a shorter duration of benefits.
Perhaps the most cost effective way to use long-term care insur-
ance in the overall Medicaid plan utilizes insurance to protect assets
by financing the cost of care during the period of Medicaid ineligibil-
ity. For example, if a client makes transfers that would result in
thirty-six months of ineligibility and the client's medical condition will
permit the underwriting of a long-term care policy, it may be advisa-
ble to have the client purchase a policy with just under three years of
benefits, planning instead to pay privately for the remaining amount
if necessary. This procedure will allow the client to receive insurance
benefits until the Medicaid benefits are available.87
If a long-term care policy appears to be useful in a particular cli-
ent's overall Medicaid plan, it is imperative to carefully evaluate the
various types of long-term care insurance policies that are presently
on the market. One of the major items which must be properly as-
the greatest cost effectiveness in providing the particular benefits that the client
needs.
185. Conversely, if the client is quite willing to collect public benefits and assigns a
low priority to inheritance, long-term care insurance may not be right for the
client; provided, of course, that it seems likely that a Medicaid plan can be de-
vised that will provide the client access to the necessary care.
186. California financial planner, James H. Braziel, suggested in 1989 that purchase
of a long-term care policy is probably not appropriate for couples with a non-
exempt asset level under $150,000. See Linda Koco, What Planners Look For in
LTC Policies, NAT'L UN n .RwaR, Sept. 11, 1989, at 9.
187. One side benefit of this approach is that it can allow senior citizens to maintain
their autonomy for a longer time because transfers (and consequent loss of auton-
omy) can be deferred until illness strikes.
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sessed concerns the type of care the policy actually covers.18 8 For ex-
ample, in Dvorak v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,189 the plaintiffs
family was insured under the defendant's health and welfare benefit
plan. The defendant's plan provided for convalescent nursing home
benefits but excluded "principally custodial" care. The plaintiffs wife
was placed in a nursing home where she required constant nursing
attention as well as the administration of anti-psychotic drugs for the
treatment of Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome. Due to the level and con-
stant nature of such care, the court determined that the care was not
"principally custodial" in nature and was, therefore, covered by the
defendant's plan.19 0
Long-term care insurance policies and the payment of premiums
on such policies raise two important income tax considerations. The
first issue regards the ability of the policy owner to deduct amounts
paid for premiums as a medical expense deduction.19' Generally,
amounts paid for medical expenses can be deducted if the reason for
the expense is a medical necessity.' 9 2 Arguably, if a long-term care
insurance policy is designed to assist with a medical need, even
though the policy strictly covers custodial care, the premium should be
deductible as a medical expense.' 93 This argument is even stronger if
benefits under the long-term care policy are triggered by a medical
need certification.L9 4
A related tax issue concerns the treatment of benefits received
under a long-term care insurance policy. Payments that a taxpayer
receives under a health insurance policy for reimbursement of medical
expenses are excluded from income. 195 If long-term care policies are
treated the same as health care policies for purposes of premium de-
188. For instance, does the policy cover "skilled nursing care" or is it limited to "princi-
pally custodial care"? Other issues that practitioners should investigate include
an analysis of how much will be paid for each level of care; how long benefits will
be paid; whether the policy sets a maximum benefit level; whether benefits in-
crease with inflation; a determination as to whether there is a waiting period
before benefits become payable; and whether pre-existing conditions are covered.
Also important in analyzing long-term care insurance policies is a determination
of what the eligibility requirements are; whether Alzheimer's and/or Parkinson's
disease (the two leading debilitating diseases of the elderly) are covered; whether
the insurer can cancel the policy; whether the insurer has at least an "A" rating
from a reporting agency; and what is the benefit trigger mechanism.
189. 965 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 610.
191. I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1994) allows a taxpayer to take a deduction for certain
amounts paid for medical expenses.
192. See, e.g., Thoene v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 62 (1959).
193. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(b) (1993)(amount of nursing home bill cov-
ering medical care furnished to the institutionalized person is deductible).
194. See, e.g., Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
195. I.R.C. § 105(b) (West 1993).
[Vol. 73:104
LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE
ductibility, then payments received as reimbursements should like-
wise be excluded from income.' 96
11. Medicaid Appeals Process
Another planning technique involves using the Medicaid appeals
process to divert as much income as possible from the institutionalized
spouse to the community spouse in order to bring the community
spouse up to a specified minimum level of monthly income. 197 Utiliz-
ing the Medicaid appeals process to increase the Community Spouse
Resource Allowance (CSRA) can be an invaluable tool for protecting
family assets by diverting them to the community spouse.
State Medicaid agencies are required to grant upon request a "fair
hearing" to any Medicaid applicant whose claim for services was de-
nied or not acted upon with reasonable promptness or to any benefit
recipient whose benefits have been terminated, discontinued, sus-
pended, or reduced erroneously.198 However, an individual has no
right to a hearing if the only issue involved is a federal or state law
requiring a change that adversely affects the claimant or other
recipients. 199
Before filing an appeal, an applicant or an individual who is receiv-
ing Medicaid benefits must receive adequate written notice of the
Medicaid agency's decision about the individual's benefits.200 In most
cases, the agency must mail its notice at least ten days before reduc-
ing or discontinuing Medicaid benefits. This ten day period may be
shortened to five days in case of fraud.201
A hearing must be requested within ten days following the date of
the agency's mailing of the notice in cases involving termination, dis-
continuance, suspension, or reduction of benefits.202 In all other situ-
ations, an individual must be given a reasonable time, not exceeding
ninety days, to request a hearing.203 If the request is filed within ten
days after the agency has mailed the notice, the state may, but need
not, reinstate benefits.204 Where benefits are continued or reinstated
196. The IRS' present position on this issue is unclear.
197. 42 U.S.CA. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1994).
198. Id. § 1396a(a)(3).
199. 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (1993).
200. Id. § 431.206(b). See also Zellweger v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 547
N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 1989).
201. 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.211, 431.214 (1993). Advance notice need not be given when a
change in the level of medical care (e.g., transfer from a skilled nursing facility to
an intermediate care facility) is prescribed by the recipient's physician. See, e.g.,
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
202. 42 C.F.R. § 431.230(a) (1993).
203. Id. § 431.221(d).
204. Id. § 431.231(a).
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upon timely request for a hearing, they must continue until a hearing
decision is made.20 5
The request for a fair hearing should be filed on the appropriate
agency form or in writing as stipulated by the agency. 20 6 The request
should include the following information:
(1) the person requesting a hearing;
(2) that the person is dissatisfied with the action the agency has de-
cided to take on his or her application;
(3) a request for an interpreter if the claimant does not speak Eng-
lish; and
(4) a request that, if a hearing in the agency's office would burden
the claimant, the hearing be held in the claimant's home, hospi-
tal, nursing home, or other convenient place.
Before the hearing, the claimant or the claimant's representative
has the right to examine the claimant's case file at the agency in addi-
tion to all the documents and records to be used by the agency at the
hearing.20 7 The hearing is to be conducted by a hearing officer who
did not participate in the agency's decision, 20 8 and the claimant or the
claimant's representative may present witnesses, evidence, and argu-
ments as well as confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 20 9
The hearing officer's decision must be in writing and must be based
solely on evidence introduced at the hearing.2 10 The hearing officer's
decision must summarize the facts, specify the reasons for the deci-
sions, and identify the supporting evidence in regulations. 2 11 The
claimant must be notified in writing of the decision and the claimant's
right to seek further administrative or judicial review. 212
An appeal from the hearing officer's decision must be taken to the
state agencies within fifteen days from the mailing of the hearing deci-
sion to the individual.213 The claimant must specifically request a de
novo hearing.2 14 Otherwise, the state Medicaid agency will review
only the record of the hearing to see if the decision was supported by
substantial evidence.215 The claimant maintains the identical rights
at the de novo hearing as he or she had at the earlier local hearing.216
205. Id. §§ 431.230(a), 431.231(c). See also Frank v. Kizer, 261 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Ct. App.
1989).
206. 42 C.F.R. § 431.221(a) (1993).
207. Id. § 431.242(a).
208. Id. § 431.240(a)(3).
209. Id. § 431.242(b)-(e).
210. Id. §§ 431.244(a), 431.245.
211. Id. § 431.244(e).
212. Id. § 431.245.
213. Id. § 431.232(b).
214. Id. § 431.233(a).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 431.242(b)-(e).
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Notice of the decision must be in writing, informing the claimant of
any right to judicial review. 217 Judicial review may be sought in the
state or federal courts, subject to the usual jurisdictional and filing
requirements.
Perhaps the most useful manner in which to utilize the fair hear-
ing process is to increase the Community Spouse Resource Allowance
(CSRA).218 This is a monetary sum that can be added to the commu-
nity spouse's other income on a monthly basis to bring the community
spouse up to a minimum specified level of monthly income. This pro-
cess can be explained in the following manner.
For married individuals at the time one spouse makes an applica-
tion for Medicaid benefits, there is a one-time computation of the non-
exempt resources of both spouses.219 The total fair market value of
those resources is considered to be available to the spouse that is ap-
plying for Medicaid benefits.220 A spousal share equivalent to one-
half of the total value of the combined assets is also computed at the
time of the initial Medicaid eligibility determination.221 However, an
exception to the one-half spousal attribution rule permits the commu-
nity spouse to retain a spousal share of assets worth up to $72,660 (as
of January 1, 1994).222 The community spouse's assets not exceeding
$72,660 will not be considered available to the institutionalized
spouse for eligibility purposes.223 Medicaid eligibility is achieved for
the spouse that is making an application when both spouses spend-
down their asset shares to the applicable limit for each spouse. 224
Additionally, the community spouse is entitled to divert as much
income from the institutionalized spouse as is necessary to provide a
minimum level of monthly income.225 Using the Medicaid appeals
217. Id. § 431.245.
218. See, e.g., 42 U.S.CA. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
219. Id. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
220. Id. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A).
221. Id. 1396r-5(c)(1)(A)(ii).
222. Id. § 1396r-5(f)(2XA)(ii). However, for couples with a minimal amount of non-
exempt assets, the floor spousal share is set at $14,532. Id.
223. 42 U.S.C-. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
224. While the federal Medicaid law mandates income spend-down, it does not require
resource spend-down (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (West Supp. 1994)). See, e.g.,
Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046B-H, 1992 WL 133116 (D. Me. 1992)
(holding that failure of state to permit resource spend-down, but to permit income
spend-down does not violate equal protection clause); Matarazzo v. Rowe, 623
A.2d 470 (Conn. 1993) (holding that § 209(b) state only required to utilize re-
source spend-down if state utilized resource spend-down on Jan. 1, 1972); Lieber-
man v. Connecticut Comm'r of Income Maintenance, No. Cd-90-0438316-S, 1992
WL 294938 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that Connecticut law does not re-
quire resource spend-down); Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah
1993).
225. 42 U.S.CA. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
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process to divert additional income from the institutionalized spouse
to the community spouse is illustrated in the following example.
Assume Mr. and Mrs. Farmer retired from active participation in
the family farming operation several years ago. At the time of retire-
ment, the farming operation was sold to their four children who are
the present operators. On the sale of the operation to the children,
Mr. and Mrs. Farmer invested the bulk of the proceeds in stock and
other securities. Mrs. Farmer is now suffering from the advanced
stages of Alzheimer's disease; she has entered a nursing home and an
application for Medicaid benefits has been made. Mr. and Mrs.
Farmer list assets as follows:
Cash $ 425,000




Under the procedure outlined above,226 each spouse would be con-
sidered to have $616,500 worth of assets.22 7 Mr. Farmer would have
to deplete his share down to $72,660, and Mrs. Farmer would have to
deplete her share down to $6,000 before Medicaid benefits could be
received.2 28
As mentioned above, the community spouse is entitled to a
monthly income allowance consisting of a minimum maintenance
needs allowance (MMNA) and an excess shelter allowance.229 Effec-
tive January 1, 1994, the maximum monthly income allowance is set
at $1,817.230 In addition, the base spousal income allowance is set at
$1,179 per month.23 1 To this base amount is added the shelter allow-
ance plus a standard utility allowance. From this base amount is
subtracted the community spouse's actual income that is received on a
monthly basis.232 The difference between the maximum monthly in-
come allowance and the income that the community spouse already
receives is the amount of income that the community spouse can shift
226. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
227. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
228. Thus, there would be a total depletion of $1,156,260.
229. Federal Medicaid law requires state Medicaid agencies to allow the community
spouse "an amount adequate to provide... a minimum monthly maintenance
needs allowance." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1994).
230. Medicare Catastrophe Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 301, 102 Stat.
683, 748 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13964(p)(2)(A) (1988)).
231. Id. § 1924(d)(3)(B)(i-iii). As of July 1, 1994, the base figure will be $1,230 per
month.
232. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1994).
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from the institutionalized spouse on a monthly basis. The following
example demonstrates this process.
Income-only approach:
Base spousal income allowance $ 1,179.00
Plus shelter allowance:
Mortgage principal plus interest $ 0.00
Taxes and Insurance $1,250.00 $ 1,250.00
Plus standard utility allowance: $ 175.00
Total $ 1,425.00
Less 30% of base: $ 353.70
$ 1,071.30
Monthly income allowance (actual) $ 2,250.30
Maximum monthly income allowance $ 1,817.00
(maximum allowable)
Less: Community spouse income $ 1,000.00
Community spouse monthly income needed $ 817.00
Community spouse resource allowance
(CSRA) needed to meet monthly income:
$ 817.00 + .04 = $ 20,425.00
CRSA annualized: $245,100.00
Amount of assets available to meet
annualized CSRA amount $616,500.00
Thus, Mr. Farmer, as the community spouse, will be entitled to
retain an additional $245,100 of his spouse's asset share. As a result,
an additional $245,100 worth of the family assets will be preserved
from depletion paying for Mrs. Farmer's long-term health care.
Until recently, it was believed that the amount of the increase in
the CSRA that was needed to meet the community spouse's MMNA
was arrived at by applying a prevailing interest rate to the shortfall in
monthly income in order to determine the amount of income generated
by the underlying assets needed to increase the MMNA to the mini-
mum level. With the decline in interest rates in recent years, the level
of assets needed to generate a specific level of income has in-
creased. 233 Potentially, this can result in the shifting of a larger por-
tion of the institutionalized spouse's asset share away from the
institutionalized spouse.
A recent Iowa Supreme Court case has significantly reduced the
opportunity to shift assets away from an institutionalized spouse in
the era of low interest rates. In Ford v. Iowa Department of Human
Services,2 34 the Iowa Medicaid agency used the cost of an annuity to
measure the amount of the increase in the CSRA needed to meet the
MMNA. This approach vastly reduced any increase in the CSRA. The
233. However, since President Clinton took office in January 1993, interest rates have
risen approximately 25%. See, e.g., Markets Diary, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1994, at
C1.
234. 500 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1993).
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court reasoned that the return from principal is indistinguishable
from interest earnings and should likewise be considered as in-
come. 23 5 In addition, the court held that the income-only approach
was not mandated by federal law.236
IV. PROTECTING THE MEDICAID BENEFICIARY AND
BENEFICIARY'S ESTATE FROM REIMBURSEMENT
CLAIMS
Before OBRA '93, the Medicaid law contained a third party recov-
ery provision which required state agencies administering Medicaid
programs to "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal lia-
bility of third parties to pay for care and services under Medicaid."237
The purpose of this provision was to benefit both the federal and state
governments. 2 38
Much of the litigation surrounding the old reimbursement provi-
sions focused upon a state's right of obtaining reimbursement through
subrogation, the ability of state Medicaid agencies to place liens on
damage awards won by Medicaid recipients in court, and the ability of
state Medicaid agencies to successfully seek reimbursement from
trusts. For example, in Kittle v. Icard,239 the court held that the state
Medicaid agency's right of reimbursement through subrogation was
limited by principles of equity unless the state agency could demon-
strate that it had a clear case of right and that no injustice would
occur to any other individual.240 In Meredith v. Schreiner Transport,
Inc.,241 the court held that the Kansas state Medicaid agency's motion
to intervene for payment of a lien on a judgment recovered by a Medi-
caid recipient had to be timely filed. Moreover, the lien claim must
meet the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement.242 As to
the issue of reimbursement from trusts, in Society National Bank
Ass'n v. Cayuga County,243 the court held that the Ohio state Medi-
caid agency was not entitled to reimbursement for Medicaid assist-
ance provided to a trust beneficiary where the trust was not in
existence at the time of the application, and the spendthrift provisions
of the trust did not give the beneficiary any legal interest in the
trust.24 4
235. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. 1382a(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
236. Ford v. Iowa Dep't of Human Serv., 500 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (Iowa 1993).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1988).
238. Thus, third party liability could not be sought from the federal government. New
York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bowen, 684 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
239. 405 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1991).
240. Id. at 464.
241. 814 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Kan. 1993).
242. Id. at 1003-04.
243. No. 13624, 1993 WL 65747 (Ohio App. 2d 1993).
244. Id. at 3-4.
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Under the old law, reimbursement was also authorized from the
estates of individuals over the age of sixty-five when benefits were re-
ceived and from the sale proceeds of property subject to a lien imposed
due to the payment of medical assistance benefits.245 Courts con-
strued the definition of "estate" contained in this provision as limiting
a state Medicaid agency's recovery to property that descended to a re-
cipients's heir or beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death.246
Thus, property held in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient was
protected from a reimbursement claim upon the recipient's death.247
In addition, one federal appellate court has held that Medicaid recipi-
ents (and their estates) are not legally responsible for amounts not
reimbursed to providers of medical services by state Medicaid
agencies. 248
Under OBRA '93, the states are required to adopt programs to re-
cover Medicaid benefits from deceased recipients' estates dying on or
after October 1, 1993 and any benefits paid on or after October 1,
1993.249 The states are directed to recover benefits paid to nursing
facility services, home and community-based services, and related
hospital and prescription drug services for anyone who at the time
was fifty-five or older.250
Under the new law, the definition of estate has changed to include
a decedent's probate estate under state law plus:
any other real and personal property and any other assets in which the indi-
vidual had any legal title or interest at the time of death... including such
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, living
trust or other arrangement.25 1
A recent New York case has interpreted the estate recovery provi-
sions of OBRA '93 as they apply to the possible reimbursement from
the estate of an individual whose predeceased spouse had received
Medicaid benefits. In Estate of Craig,252 the state Medicaid agency
paid the medical bill for an elderly individual and made no attempt to
collect any portion of the bill from the decedent's spouse because the
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A-B) (1988).
246. See, e.g., Citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1989).
247. Similarly, property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety was also likely to be pro-
tected. See, e.g., Estate of Savage v. Pogue, 650 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
This interpretation created an incentive for at-home care to be provided to a
Medicaid recipient in exchange for the care-giver having a place to live, both dur-
ing the provision of care and after the recipients death.
248. Banks v. Secretary of the Ind. Family & Social Serv. Admin., 997 F.2d 231 (7th
Cir. 1993).
249. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107
Stat. 312, 627 (1993)(to be codified at 442 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 13612(c), 107 Stat. 312, 628.
252. 604 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1993).
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surviving spouse lacked "sufficient means" to be considered a finan-
cially responsible relative at the time of the decedent's death.253
Before the surviving spouse died six years after the decedent's
death, the surviving spouse had also received Medicaid benefits. At
the time of the surviving spouse's death, the total Medicaid bill paid
by the state for the surviving spouse and the predeceased spouse were
less than the total value of the surviving spouse's estate at the time of
the surviving spouse's death. Upon the surviving spouse's death, the
state Medicaid agency attempted to recover the total amount of Medi-
caid payments for both spouses from the surviving spouse's estate.
The surviving spouse's estate reimbursed the state Medicaid agency
for the assistance paid to the surviving spouse but refused to pay the
claim representing the amount of Medicaid benefits the predeceased
spouse received.254
The state Medicaid agency argued that the "sufficient means test"
as set forth in the state Medicaid law had no application after both
spouses were deceased. Thus, the state argued that it should be enti-
tled to full reimbursement for Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of both
spouses, once both spouses are deceased.255
The court disagreed with the state Medicaid agency, holding that
Medicaid assistance paid on behalf of the predeceased spouse may not
be recouped from the surviving spouse's estate where the surviving
spouse did not have sufficient means to be considered a responsible
relative at the time payments were made on behalf of the predeceased
spouse.256 In essence, the court held that a surviving spouse must
have sufficient means at the time of the predeceased spouse's death to
be considered a financially responsible relative. In addition, the court
also commented on OBRA '93, stating that it had no bearing on the
case. 25 7 Under OBRA '93, states may only seek reimbursement
against the recipient's assets that were conveyed through joint ten-
ancy and other specified forms for survivorship. In Craig, the prede-
ceased spouse died intestate.
OBRA '93 also directs the Secretary to establish standards and cri-
teria for states to follow in setting procedures for waiver of estate re-
covery in cases of undue hardship.258 Apparently, Congress wants the
hardship provision to be used, providing in the new law for specific
instances when the hardship waiver should be granted. These in-
stances include income producing property such as a family farm or
253. Id. at 909.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 910.
256. Id. at 911.
257. Id.
258. Omnibus Budget Reconcillation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107
Stat. 312, 628 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1).
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other family businesses involved, a homestead of modest value, or
other compelling circumstances. 259 Further, the new law contains ex-
ceptions to the estate and recovery provisions for any individuals re-
ceiving benefits under long-term care insurance. 260
V. CONCLUSION
The possibility for long-term health care must be factored into the
overall estate plan. Failure to account for potential long-term health
care needs early in the estate planning process can lead to undesirable
results for the client. As a result, preserving the largest amount of
assets for the heirs necessitates a knowledge of the federal Medicaid
law and the applicable state laws governing public assistance benefits
and how qualification for those particular benefits can be achieved.
The federal Medicaid statue is complex and requires a great deal of
time to gain a working knowledge of its intricacies. However, even a
rudimentary knowledge of the Medicaid law can be extremely useful
for the representation of many elderly clients. An awareness of the
Medicaid law's estate planning opportunities addressed in this Article
are necessary to properly advise elderly or disabled clients.
While the estate planning opportunities have been significantly
foreclosed by OBRA '93, some estate planning techniques remain via-
ble options. In addition, the overall Medicaid appeals process and the
ability to use the fair hearing process to increase the CSRA remains
intact, even if to a smaller extent. While much of the benefit of trust
planning has been foreclosed by OBRA '93, the treatment of GRITs
remains uncertain. If the treatment of corpus and income of a GRIT is
resolved in favor of Medicaid applicants, such trusts will remain a via-
ble estate planning tool. Moreover, if the client is an owner of a closely
held business, utilizing a series of lifetime gifting to work the client
into a minority position before a Medicaid application is made can
prove invaluable.
While the financial cost of long-term health care can be devastat-
ing, practitioners who counsel their clients to responsibly manage
their financial resources and who have a general understanding of the
Medicaid law's requirements and estate planning possibilities will re-
main a cut above many estate planners.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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